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LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

USIP Event: The role of the independent diplomat
March 5, 2008
By Matthew Plocher

A forum was held Wednesday at the United States Institute of Peace that focused on the work of a new organization, Independent Diplomats (ID).  This group is a body of skilled, unaffiliated diplomats who, at the behest of small nations and political groups, offer diplomatic services and advice in an effort to address the sizable “diplomatic deficit” that exists between these small entities and the established international powers that decide their fate.  USIP’s Daniel Serwer served as the moderator of the discussion.  The featured speakers were Carne Ross, former British diplomat, current president of ID, and author of the just-published book Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite; and Soren Jessen-Petersen, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General in Kosovo, current guest scholar at USIP, and new head of the recently opened ID office in Washington, D.C.

Serwer provided the opening remarks, stressing how essential the work of ID is.  If not for ID, he said, nations like Kosovo would continually be at a disadvantage when involved in a dispute with a more powerful, organized, and experienced country.  He then gave a brief synopsis of Ross’s professional history, lauding him for his efforts as a U.N. representative.

Ross said his inspiration for creating an organization like ID came from his time working as a British representative in the U.N. Security Council.  He worked closely with the intelligence community regarding Iraq’s capacity to produce WMDs.  After giving testimony that conflicted with the views of his government, and seeing them soundly ignored, he resigned from his U.N. post.  He was disillusioned by the disconnect between the decision makers in the U.N. and the people being discussed.  He saw the lack on any direct contact between the two parties as a serious impediment to making worthwhile decisions.  Permanently solving a conflict would be impossible without substantial contributions by the parties involved in the dispute, he said.  For Ross, all of these feelings were brought home in Kosovo. When it came time to discuss power sharing and territory concessions, the Kosovars had no ability to self-articulate their positions in the manner that traditional diplomacy demanded of them.  The problem was not just in Kosovo however.  It was endemic in the system.  The Kosovars were not allowed to have offices, representatives, or official publications within the body of the U.N. or NATO.  They had no real means of effectively expressing their desires to the arbiter of the discussion.  That frustration resulted in massive riots in 2004 that claimed almost two dozen lives and proved to be unstoppable by the local authorities.  Ross was happy to note that ID’s first client was the recently formed Kosovar government.  Since ID has been involved, they have made great strides in establishing diplomatic ties with other countries and demanding attention from integral international bodies.

Ross went on to further explain what he described as the complicated and bureaucratic nature of the U.N., and the difficulties faced by small nations in finding basic information regarding their status within offices like the Security Council.  Currently ID has five “clients”: the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, the exiled government of Burma, the government of Croatia, the Somaliland government, and the Western Sahara peoples.  He stressed the clientele nature of their relationship.  The countries make their own decisions, and have their own objectives, he said, but they needed help communicating them.  One of his mottos is “We don’t know best.”  Ross indicated that this represents his departure from the arrogant and detached nature of the U.N.’s decision making process.  He closed his speech by emphasizing that his organization was not the embodiment of some sanctimonious desire to right the world’s wrongs, but rather offered a realistic approach to improving an inefficient diplomatic system that is unable to adequately solve disputes or make sound policy.

Jessen-Petersen then addressed the audience.  It was his experience in Kosovo in 2004 that prompted his appreciation of the diplomatic deficit.  As he watched the arbitration between Kosovo and Serbia, the difference between their capabilities was glaring.  Returning to U.N. headquarters, he was frustrated by the attention given to absurd formalities like seating arrangement while decent translators were lacking.  The exclusion of Kosovo’s in the discussions at the U.N. additionally impelled him to join ID.

During the question and answer session, a woman asked if ID ever advised their clients on their internal politics, as they often are influential in a nation’s international reputation.  Ross answered with a tentative ‘yes.’  He said that ID is honest with the client nations, and reminds them of the inter-relatedness of domestic and foreign policy, but works hard to avoid influencing their decision making.  Also, ID reserves the right to stop working with a client nation if their internal policies did not conform to ID standards of honest democratic process.

Two different Somali men then made comments.  One objected to ID’s involvement with the government of Somaliland, which he viewed as representative of a noisy minority whose desires for independence were not shared by the entire country.  The second gentleman objected to ID’s acceptance of what, in his opinion, constituted civil rights violations by the Somaliland government, and accused ID of being complicit with those if they did not object.  Ross responded by saying that ID had spoken with the government about its recent restrictions on the press, but added that they had taken steps before they accepted Somaliland as a client.  These included interviewing opposition leaders in person to ensure that the democratic process was in fact open.  He argued that while there might be agreement on domestic matters, there was a national consensus on foreign policy.

Next a man identifying himself as Persian asked what advice Ross would give Hamas.  Ross sarcastically thanked the man for such an easy question, and said that ID would never work with Hamas as it stands now, as ID never is involved with a entity that practices violence.  However, he tempered that by saying that he was of the opinion that if you want to speak peace, you must go to those speaking war.  He also said that ID has worked with several Palestinian Diaspora groups.

The final question was asked by a female teacher who had taught abroad.  She asked how we improve the American embassy system.  All three panelists agreed that the current structure and attitude of embassies have a negative impact on formulating positive foreign policy decisions.  Ross called it ridiculously hierarchical and an outdated practice that fails to inform governments of what was really going on.

Serwer made the closing remarks, explaining that a sizable gap exists between official diplomacy and the real situations on the ground.  If left unfilled, he said, this space will result in chronically poor decision-making by the U.N. and NATO.  Serwer stressed that it is up to organizations like ID to fill this space and bridge the gap between the people involved in the world’s conflicts and those attempting to solve them.

 

 

 

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