|
USIP forum: ‘Iraq’s mystery men: insurgents, tribes, and Sadrists’
January 29, 2008
By Christina Caspersen
At a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) public event Tuesday, a panel of experts discussed the nature of Iraqi leadership outside of the central government in Baghdad.
Amatzia Baram, a former USIP senior fellow, discussed the mystery entity of tribes. From 1921 to 1958, the monarchy in Iraq was held in place by tribal groupings. However in late 1958, according to Baram, the tribes in Iraq “disappeared” and soon became a “thing of the past.” In 1969, land reform was enhanced in hopes of eliminating the sheikhs who were seen as the rival elite.
It was Saddam Hussein who quickly changed things. He altered the approach of land reform and began to visit the banished sheikhs. From 1968-1991 Hussein manipulated the tribal system, while remaining under the radar. And then suddenly in 1991, the tribes and sheikhs began appearing in the media. The tribes that had been silenced and tucked away started to resurface once again. Saddam recruited his tribesman to be bodyguards and protectors of his regime. He trusted the sheikhs, knew how to deal with them, and knew what they wanted, Baram said. He also promulgated anti-Persian sentiments, which are still present today, by killing a whole family of Persians.
Currently in Iraq, the cooperation with tribes that the U.S. has established is becoming quite effective, Baram said, adding that it is also unavoidable. In six months causalities have declined by 50 percent due to the tribal collaborations. Baram concluded with this remark: “We are riding a tiger, and what we are currently doing is an art. It is a tight rope act between the tribes and the central government.”
Reider Visser, a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, spoke on “Beyond Muqtada, Mystery Men of the Sadrist Movement in Iraq.” According to U.S. military generals, the idea of Mahdism (the Messiah who, it is believed, will appear at the world’s end and establish a reign of peace) is seen as a threat to Iraq’s stability. However, Visser, disagrees because he considers Mahdists to have a good track record. They are members of Parliament and move beyond sectarianism, he said. Visser argued that despite what some in the U.S. government might believe, “Mahdism believers had nothing to do with the Iraq War, nor did 9/11 or WMD.”
Visser warned that Mahdists should not necessarily be viewed as terrorists and that the U.S. should not be so quick to listen to the Iraqi government, which, he argued, is attempting to “gloss over” its inner conflicts by blaming groups such as the Mahdists. Visser concluded that the U.S. should not let the Iraqi government “pick who is a good Shiite and who isn’t.”
Sam Parker, an Iraq program officer in USIP’s Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, discussed the final group of mystery men addressed in the forum: the insurgents. Sunni insurgents, according to Parker, are the most mysterious of the three groups. However as of 2007, they are becoming more open and political. The insurgent group has begun to realize that there is a need for insurgent politics and a resistance against al-Qaeda.
Parker also spoke of a “Great Consolidation,” which can be broken down into four categories. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)/al-Qaeda constitutes the first category, with both parties holding “transnational ambitions,” he said. The ISI differs from al-Qaeda for two reasons, Parker said. One, there is a strong Iraqi identity that the ISI has seized upon, and two, the ISI wants to become a political movement with power and a voice.
The Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance, which Parker said does not possess transnational goals, constitutes the second category of the consolidation. Parker compared this group to the Palestinian group Hamas. The Front for Jihad and Change, ostensibly a group of “Iraqi patriots,” constitutes the third category, Parker said. The fourth category is comprised of the High Command for Jihad and Liberation – a group which turned against al-Qaeda. Parker said that this move was beneficial because al-Qaeda does not protect its citizens, but rather metaphorically “eats” them. He compared al-Qaeda to a snake that eats its own tail when hungry.
Parker added that the last three categories of the consolidation issued political platforms that completely reject the United States – with no room for flexibility.
Moderator Daniel Serwer, who recently returned from Iraq, concluded by stating that the situation in Iraq is not deadlocked. The movements by individuals have political intent and want to express what their constituents want. |
