Fethullah Gülen: His Movement and Position in Turkish Politics

Meghan Rasmussen

Introduction
What has been called the “largest civil movement in Turkey,” with “transformative influences on Turkish society, nationalist Islam, and political Islam,” (Yilmaz 2005) Fethullah Gülen and his followers hold a unique position in Turkey’s debate over what unites their secular state and predominantly Muslim people. According to Ihsan Yilmaz, a leading scholar of Turkish politics, with millions of followers and sympathizers, Gülen himself is also referred to as “the unofficial civil religious leader of Turkey” (2005:394). Though little known in the United States, for many years Fethullah Gülen was an unofficial ambassador for Turkey. He has spoken on modern Islam and tolerance, meeting with religious leaders such as Pope John Paul II and with prime ministers and presidents in his home country. Gülen’s discourse has, and will continue to have, a major influence in shaping the future of Turkey.
The Gülen movement was derived from the work and writings of the prominent religious authority, Said Nursi (1877-1961),. The followers of Said Nursi make up the Islamic movements of the Nurcu’s, of which the Gülen movement is one of the most prominent. The origins of the Gülen movement stem from a small group known as the “Izmir Community,” founded in Izmir in 1962 by Islamic preacher, Fethullah Gülen. Quickly expanding to be what is known widely as the Gülen movement, Gülen and his followers have strived to “Islamize the Turkish nationalist ideology and to Turkify Islam” (Aras and Çaha 2000). Gülen preaches the moderation of “Turkish Islam.” In this way, it is thought that Turkey can revive the multi-culturalism of the Ottoman Empire.
The Nurcu movements argued that democracy and Islam are not contradictory, stressing the significance of popular democracy and the freedoms necessary for individuals to realize the power of God. In this way, religion is viewed as a private or communal matter as opposed to a political or state matter. The Gülen movement adds the components of the free market and pan-Turkish nationalism to its emphasis on the Ottoman legacy. Gülen is also action-oriented whereas Said Nursi stressed cognitive understanding (Awan 2006).
The movement seeks to redefine the legacy of Mustufa Kemal by expanding its social bases, stressing the ghazi (“conquering Muslim hero”) aspect of Mustafa Kemal, and Islamicizing Turkish nationalism, as mentioned above. “Gülen’s activities are aimed at molding a cohesive and disciplined community through education, mass media, and financial networks” (Yavuz 1999: 123). At the same time, as Marcia Hermansen emphasizes, “as a movement that has experienced remarkable growth over the past generation, it is conscious of its evolving identity” (2005: 3).
Michael Gunter has summarized some of the preeminent scholarly work on the subject, to conclude that with this movement, “Islamic norms and traditions are being simultaneously persevered yet substantially altered to assimilate and participate in the discourses on nationalism, secularism, democracy, human rights, the liberal market, and personal autonomy” (Gunter 2004: 183). By analyzing the Gülen movement, one can thus observe that despite the best efforts of the Turkish state, a profound transformation has taken place among Turkish Islamic groups as a result of the weakening Kemalist hegemony and the emergence of new public spaces (Yavuz 1999).

Structure
Fethullah Gülen is the sole leader of the movement. However, a number of long-time devotees run the activities of the community. The Gülen movement is in fact, a “conglomerate of networks concentrated around four main clusters of activities: economic enterprises, educational institutions; publications and broadcasting; and religious gatherings” (Özdalga 2005: 435). Through these activities, with TV and radio stations, an extensive network of schools, finance companies, and publishing houses, the movement has an institutional reach that extends far into Turkey’s civil life. The movement runs its own media including the widely circulated Zaman daily newspaper. There are approximately 300 Gülen schools across Turkey, having quickly grown in number in recent years. The movement also has a pan-Turkish orientation, funding schools and activities throughout the Turkic republics and across the countries of the former USSR. Moreover, Gülen’s followers organize national and international symposiums, bringing in scholars and intellectuals from across the globe. Thus, Fethullah Gülen’s influence comes not only from his charisma, writings, and high-level interaction with Turkey’s political leaders, but also from the large number of educational and social institutions that have been established by his followers.
Importantly, with Turkey’s liberalization in the 1990s, we saw a growth of small and medium-sized businesses. This segment of society has been mobilized by, and in turn financially supported, the Gülen movement. The allegiance of this network of business elites has allowed for the rapid expansion of Gülen institutions. As Michael Gunter has pointed out, Turkey’s political democratization, as well as its economic liberalization and development, can be seen within the context of an Islamic-identity resurgence (Gunter 2004).
To join the Gülen community, there is no formal process. Rather, members typically encounter the movement in educational settings or through contacts in their personal circle of relatives and acquaintances. Most of the senior members of the community receive the title of “Hoca,” or teacher. Some members prefer to characterize themselves as a civil social movement, although this is viewed by some observers as glossing over the religious dimension of their commitment and activities (Hermansen 2005: 10).

Teachings
“The Gülen community has developed a rich array of symbolic self-understandings and representations. This variety fulfills the need for creating a sense of unity and collective identification beyond the interests and experiences of individual members” (Hermansen 2005: 27). In her interviews with followers of Gülen, Marcia Hermansen came upon individual lists of the movement’s principles such as this one: 1) dialogue/tolerance; 2) self-sacrifice and altruism; 3) avoidance of political and ideological conflict; 4) taking action in a positive and harmonious way; and 5) taking responsibility (ibid).
Scholars have contended that Gülen has reconciled the often distant and contradictory notions of faith and tolerance. He has encouraged individuals to practice tolerance not in spite of, but as a consequence of, their loyalty to Islam. As Muzaffar Awan explains, “Gülen neither proposes rigid traditionalism that completely rejects modern values, nor a nostalgic return to the madrasah type education of Ottoman times. Rather he finds an Islamic middle ground that stands in a critical engagement with modernity” (2006). This is of course, the ideal. Nevertheless, the movement’s writings by Said Nursi, Fethullah Gülen, and others, provide a “field of shared values and identities, synthesized at a level of abstraction higher than the levels expressed by the separate family, professional, or local networks.” (Özdalga 2005: 437).
Bülent Aras and Ömer Çaha similarly attest that the Gülen community simultaneously has Islamic, nationalist, liberal, and modern characteristics. They argue that the movement’s “ability to reconcile traditional Islamic values with modern life and science has won a large, receptive audience. The group has even brought together divergent ideas and people, including the poor and the rich, the educated and the illiterate, Turks and Kurds, as well as Muslims and non-Muslims” (Aras and Çaha 2000). It is clear that for some analysts and observers, Gülen's movement can be a model for the future of Islamic political and social activism. Furthermore, the movement is generally considered “modern” for its union of individual ability and collective identity, as well as of local networks and global discourse around democracy, human rights, and the market economy. Through countless activities, these goals are pursued. For example, the think-tank organization, The Journal and Writers’ Foundation, brings in scholars and intellectuals of varied ethnic, ideological, religious, and cultural backgrounds.
Gülen proposes two keys to securing peace in society: tolerance and dialogue. The Gülen community has ever-expanding dialogue activities, including outreach to many major American cities. In addition, he believes that education leads to integration into the modern world, wishing “to merge Islam into the international economic and political systems.” The emphasis on education stems from a general aim to produce and control knowledge that will empower both Muslims and the Turkish state (Yavuz 1999). Some moderate Turks see such Islamic-oriented schools and businesses as an attempt to fill a gap left by government policies and discrimination (Frantz 2000). At the same time, the Gülen schools teach only government-approved religious instruction, in Turkish and English. Tuition payments are several thousand dollars a year, and students face rigorous academic challenges. The emphasis that is placed on competition and professional work, in economic enterprise as well as education, contrasts the dominating emphasis on family relationships of the Alevi and other religious communities in Turkey.

Politics
Under the Ottoman political system, public life was regulated not according to Shari’a, but to customary law formulated by the state. Similarly, Turkey’s traditional Sufi orientation has led to Islamic movements keeping a certain distance from the politics of their times (Aras and Çaha 2000). At the same time, although the Gülen community does not directly challenge the Kemalist project, “its educational, social, and political activities have practical implications for the erosion of the Kemalist project and the emergence of a neo-Ottoman vision” (Yavuz 1999: 116).
Of critical importance, Gülen asserts that Islam and the secularity of states can be compatible. Furthermore, democracy is the only viable political system and there is no contradiction between “Islamic administration” and democracy. Ihsan Yilmaz explains that for Gülen, “Islam is not a political project to be implemented but a repository of discourse and practices for the evolution of a just and ethical society” (Yilmaz 2005). Thus, accordingly, Gülen does not endorse specific political parties but instead gives guidelines, such as honesty, by which to judge candidates.
The Gülen community is not socially, ethnically, or economically markedly different from the established Turkish elite. Nevertheless, persistent hostility with the Turkish government stems from the perceived threat to the Turkish secular identity and therefore the country’s acute form of nationalism. Fethullan Gülen met with antagonism from Turkish authorities as early as the 1970s. He was arrested in 1971 for clandestine religious activities and spent seven months in prison. Although it is true that during the premiership of Turgut Özal, from 1983 to 1993, these pressures were somewhat eased, after the 1997 oust of the Welfare Party by the National Security Council, the Gülen community was heavily targeted.
Accusations of preparations for an Islamist revolution led to a government offensive against the community in June 1999. After a year-long inquiry, a state security court issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Gülen. A prosecutor accused him of inciting his followers to plot the overthrow of Turkey's secular government, a crime punishable by death. The authorities did not try to extradite Gülen, but the warrant raised anxieties among Gülen’s followers. Reacting to the events in a New York Times interview, Gülen restated that he was not seeking to establish an Islamic regime but did support efforts to ensure that the government treated ethnic and ideological differences as a cultural mosaic, not a reason for discrimination. He told reporter, Douglas Frantz, that he had counseled patience to followers faced with corrupt civil servants and administrators intolerant of workers who were practicing Muslims "Standards of democracy and justice must be elevated to the level of our contemporaries in the West,” he said (Frantz 2000).
As Elizabeth Özdalga points out, “Gülen is not suggesting any radically different or heterodox interpretation of Islam, but adopts a solid, conventional Hanefi/Sunni understanding of the religious traditions. So it does not seem to be the content of the religious interpretation as such, but the very existence of a new relatively strong group, filled with religious fervor and claiming a place in the public arena that annoys the establishment… thus, it is not religion per se that is at the root of the conflict. On the contrary, religion has been used as a false ideology to displace the real threat” (Özdalga 2005: 441).
Ihsan Yavuz has argued that on issues such as women’s rights and education, Gülen himself has a more liberal position than does his movement. Yavuz concludes that the conservative nature of Turkish society has placed clear limitations on Gülen’s promotion of tolerance and diversity (Yavuz 1999). The movement has adopted a cautious stance, generally refraining from entering public debates on controversial issues. For example, Gülen’s followers hardly question the oppressive policies of the Turkish state and do not oppose the hard line against the Kurdish identity. As a result of these limitations, scholars such as Yavuz also argue that Gülen’s notion of politics cannot be considered liberal.
According to Aras and Çaha, Gülen has considerable political weight on the right of the political spectrum (Aras and Çaha 2000). This has increased alongside the popularity of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), although the two religiously strong groups are not related and the Gülen movement has frequently criticized the party. There is also the belief that secularist parties offer Gülen support in exchange for a promise on his part not to endorse AKP. Regardless, the political pressure on the movement itself continues to exist. “Since conservative circles in Turkey hold the military above all other state institutions and never criticize it, if the military were to oppose Gülen strongly, he would lose his civilian support” (ibid). While his movement continues to grown in Turkey, Mr. Gülen himself holds residence in Pennsylvania, USA.

Works Cited

• Aras, Bülent and Ömer Çaha (2000) “Fethullah Gülen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4(4).
• Awan, Muzaffar K. (2006) “Turkey: A Bridge between Islam and the West” available online at http://en.fGülen.com/content/view/2269/14/.
• Frantz, Douglas (2000) “Turkey Assails a Revered Islamic Moderate,” The New York Times, August 25, 2000.
• Gunter, Michael M. (2004) “Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Book Review,” Middle East Policy 11(2) pg. 183-4.
• Hermansen, Marcia (2005) “Understandings of ‘Community’ within the Gülen Movement,” paper presented at the conference, Islam in the Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice, Rice University, November 12-13, 2005.
• Özdalga, Elizabeth (2005) “Redeemer or Outsider? The Gülen Community in the Civilizing Process,” The Muslim World 95(3) pg. 429-446.
• Yavuz, M. Hakan (1999) “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah Gülen, the Virtue Party and the Kurds,” SAIS Review 19(1) pg. 114-143.
• Yilmaz, Ihsan (2005) “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey,” The Muslim World 95(3) pg. 385-411.