Afghan Tajiks are primarily Sunni Muslims, although there are also substantial Ismaili Shia Tajik communities.[1] They speak Dari, which is a dialect of Farsi, are supposedly of Mediterranean descent, and inhabit northeastern Afghanistan near the Tajikistan border, with smaller communities in the west.[2]
Tajik identity is based on region of residence, as the group is said to be non-tribal.[3] However, this identity has been compromised by the fact that the ‘Tajik’ label is cast broadly upon non-Turkic Farsi-speaking Sunnis in Afghanistan, with little regard for ethnic affiliation.[4] The designation is also commonly affixed to urban Afghans without tribal ties.[5]
While many Tajiks reside in urban areas – Kabul in particular has a large upper middle-class Tajik population – many others still practice the traditional occupations of farming and herding.[6] These rural Tajiks, renowned for their fruit and nut harvests, which are considered to be among the nation’s best, are largely sedentary, although short seasonal migrations are often made to supplement crop yields.[7]
Demography
The Afghan Tajik community rivals only the country’s Pashtun majority population in size. The latest 2007 estimates indicate that Tajiks today constitute 27 percent of the national population, a figure that would put their current number at roughly 8.6 million.[8] This ratio has shifted little over the past seventeen years. The CIA estimate was 25 percent in 1990, and this figure held steady until 2004, when it rose two percentage points to the current estimate.[9] Further back, in 1979, there were thought to be some 3.5 million Tajiks in Afghanistan, according to a census that was reportedly severely limited in scope, which would mean that they comprised roughly 25 percent of the population at that time.[10]
As is the case with data on other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, these figures should be understood in the context of war-induced displacement, as the country has been mired in conflict for much of the past thirty years. However, the abridged and partial nature of pre-2001 national censuses should also be taken into account.
Geographic Distribution
There are large Tajik communities in Kabul and other urban areas, and also in the western province of Herat.[11] Most members of the group, however, reside to the north of Kabul in the fertile Panjshir and Shomali valleys, with large Tajik concentrations in the northeastern provinces of Perwan, Takhar, Badakshan, Baghlan, and Samangan.[12] It should be noted, however, that Badakshan, with its large mixed Shia and Sunni Tajik community, is one of the nation’s most underdeveloped regions.[13] The Hindu Kush Mountains cover much of the province, making securing high crop yields difficult.[14]
Historic Hardship
The group could lay claim to Kabul as a Tajik locale until 1776, when it became the royal seat of the Pashtun-dominated regime.[15] In the years since, Tajiks have been active in government, owing partly to their fluency in Dari, which is known as the language of administration.[16] However, except for brief periods during the 20th century, they have continued to serve under Pashtuns.
Like other Afghan minority groups, the Tajiks suffered greatly under the brutal late 19th century reign of the Sunni Pashtun ruler Amir Abdur Rahman, though they escaped the fate of the Shia Hazara, who Abdur Rahman massacred by the thousands.[17]
In 1929, Habibullah II, a Tajik, briefly served as the Afghan head of state after ousting King Amanullah in a rebellion that year. His rule was short-lived, however, as the Pashtuns quickly retook power.[18]
The country’s next Tajik leader was Burahanuddin Rabbani, who from 1992 to 1996 served as president of the so-called Islamic State of Afghanistan. Rabbani’s rule was abetted by the Tajik military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had been the first to seize Kabul after the fall of the nation’s communist government in 1992.[19] Afghanistan was plagued by civil strife during this period, and countless lives were claimed in the conflict. Trafficking of Hazara women for prostitution – sometimes as gifts for Rabbani supporters – was also widespread.[20]
Pashtun discontent simmered under Tajik rule, helping to facilitate the Taliban’s ascendance in 1996. The ultra-fundamentalist Sunni Pashtun group would go on to brutally subjugate Afghan minorities; Tajiks were not spared in their reign of terror. In December 1996, the Taliban seized the Shomali valley, spurring the exodus of 200,000 mostly Tajik residents, who fled to Kabul and the northern city of Mazar-i Sharif.[21] Some of these individuals returned a year later when Massoud retook the region, but circumstances remained tenuous there. Many Tajiks who remained in Kabul, meanwhile, were forcefully targeted, arbitrarily detained and tortured for their perceived support for Massoud and his Northern Alliance opposition forces.[22] Then in 1998, during the Taliban’s conquest of Mazar-i Sharif, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara men were rounded up in door-to-door raids.[23] In all 2,000 and 5,000 Afghans would be murdered in the massacre.[24] A year later, the group was again singled out for abuse, as Taliban fighters detained 1,000 Tajik men who were fleeing their homes with their families.[25]
In the new millennium, Taliban offensives would create large-scale Tajik displacement. The September 2000 seizure of the predominately-Tajik city of Taloqan in Takhar Province resulted in the exodus of 250,000 Afghans.[26] That same month, 10,000 Tajiks fled to islands on the Amu Darya River in Tajikistan.[27] In the wake of this large influx, the former Soviet republic would close its border to Afghan refugees; by late 2001 all six of Afghanistan’s neighbors had followed suit. Pakistan, in particular, took a hard line towards Afghan asylum seekers, forcibly deporting 80,000 of its some 170,000 refugees.[28] Tajiks comprised the majority of those deported, leading to accusations that Islamabad was engaging in pro-Pashtun discrimination and helping to facilitate Taliban rule.[29]
Ongoing Hardship
After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Tajik-dominated Shura-i Nazar-i Shamali (Supervisory Council of the North) gained the most sway in Afghanistan’s interim government, with virtually sole control over state security and national defense operations.[30] This strong representation has continued under current president Hamid Karazai, a Pashtun, although Defense Minister Marshal Muhammed Fahim, the Tajik head of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, would be dismissed amid accusations of Tajik overrepresentation in the armed forces.[31]
In recent years, Tajik officials have been accused of abusing power. In 1999, reports surfaced that Massoud and his Northern Alliance forces were obstructing the entry of humanitarian aid into northeastern Afghanistan.[32] Later, in 2004, charges of anti-Pashtun discrimination were leveled against the Tajik governor of Herat.[33] Tajik officers under Karzai have also been accused of mistreating Pashtun soldiers.[34]
In spite of the unfortunate consequences of these shifts in power, ordinary Tajiks continue to endure bias. This suffering is particularly pronounced among Shia Tajiks, who have long resorted to taqiyya (dissimulation in hostile circumstances) to conceal their faith among the majority Sunni populace.[35]
[1] Blood, Peter R. ed. (2001) Afghanistan: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.
[2] Minorities at Risk Project. (2005). College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ on June 22, 2007.
[4] Marsden, Peter. (2001). Afghanistan: Minorities, conflict and the search for peace. London: Minority Rights Group International. Retrieved from http://www.minorityrights.org/ on June 27, 2007.
[11] Riphenburg, Carol J. (2005). Ethnicity and civil society in contemporary Afghanistan. The Middle East Journal, 59(1), 31-52.
[13] Emadi, Hafizullah. (1998). The end of Taqiyya: Reaffirming the religious identity of Islmailis in Shughnan, Badakhshan – political implications for Afghanistan. Middle Eastern Studies, 34(3), 103-121.
[16] Riphenburg, Carol J.
[17] Shahrani, Nazif M. (2002). War, factionalism, and the state in Afghanistan. American Anthropologist, 104(3), 715-723.
[19] Riphenburg, Carol J.
[20] Emadi, Hafizullah. (2002). Ethnic groups and national unity in Afghanistan. Contemporary Review, 280(1632), 8-16.
[30] Riphenburg, Carol J.
[31] Emadi, Hafizullah. (2002).
[34] Riphenburg, Carol J.
[35] Emadi, Hafizullah. (1998).